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For the first time in five years, the European Council meeting on 
19./20. December 2013 will exclusively be dedicated to military 
issues. Advertised as the most important gathering for the future 
of the “Common Security and Defense Policy” (CSDP) in recent 
memories, for months if not years a plethora of papers, propo-
sals and committees were busy preparing this European1 summit. 
Although other sources will be used when deemed necessary, in 
order to get some insights what will be at issue at the summit 
and to shed some light on the strategic debate in the European 
Union as a whole, in the following, we will largely focus on the 
three most important contributions in this context: ‘Preparing the 
December 2013 European Council on Security and Defence’, writ-
ten by Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the CSDP 
(Ashton 2013); the paper ‘Towards a European Global Strategy’ 
(EGS 2013), prepared by the ‘Global Strategy Project’ that had 
been initiated by the foreign ministers of Italy, Poland, Spain and 
Sweden; and, last but not least, the report ‘Enabling the future: 
Global Power Europe: 
The hidden imperial Agenda behind the 
European Council, 19./20. December 2013
by Sabine Lösing and Jürgen Wagner
European military capabilities 2013-2025: challenges and avenues’ 
(Rogers and Gilli 2013), published by the European Union’s most 
important think tank, the Institute for Security Studies (EUISS).2
Although in those contributions, numerous aspects are touched, 
they by and large all revolve around the same questions: How 
can the European Union develop a geostrategy that enables it to 
become a Global Power? What is the role of the military in order to 
foster this goal? Where should Europe’s military intervene - and for 
what purposes? And finally, how can the military capacities deemed 
necessary be generated, in light of a public that is highly skeptical 
towards any increases in military spending? 
As we will see, out of the three reviewed papers, the most dange-
rous and aggressive one is the EUISS report “Enabling the future” 
which was authored by James Rogers and Andrea Gilli. It speaks 
volumes that Europe’s most important think tank entrusts a person 
like James Rogers with the preparation of its contribution to the 
summit. He is the Co-Director of the ‘Group on Grand Strategy’, 
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an association of prominent EU geopoliticians that is vehemently 
lobbying for a European role as a Global Power. For this purpose 
they argue that Europe must embrace an ambitious geostrategy 
which is defined by Rogers (2011: 12) as follows: “The ultimate 
aim of geostrategy, then, is to link geography and politics to maxi-
mize the power and reach of the domestic territory. […] Such an 
approach must be backed up by a subtle but formidable military 
posture, which aims to prevent potential rivals from emerging.“
By drawing on additional material from other members of the 
‘Group on Grand Strategy’, and particularly by James Rogers him-
self, this article tries to show that there indeed exists such a coherent 
European imperial geostrategy and to name its essential elements. 
Furthermore, it shall be illustrated that the most important ele-
ments of this strategy can not only be found in the paper from 
Rogers and Gilli but also - although more implicit than explicit - in 
the other two reviewed papers for the preparation of the summit. 
Thereby this article tries to shed light on the hidden imperial 
agenda of Europe’s defence summit - and also on the obstacles this 
ambitious and dangerous expansionist project still faces. This hope-
fully should help to enable us to identify how concrete proposals to 
‘improve’ Europe’s military shape fit in the grand picture of a stra-
tegic debate that aims to produce an aggressive imperial geostrategy 
for Europe as a world power.
1. Political Ambitions: Global Power, 
not Global Peace 
From its very beginning, the European Union has tried to pursue 
two overarching goals, the saying goes: prosperity and peace. We 
do not have to investigate the truth of this claim as it has become 
painfully clear that this nowadays clearly no longer holds true. As 
far as prosperity is concerned, we all know what has happened since 
the economic and financial crisis broke out. But peace as a guiding 
vision, holding the European project together, is also increasingly 
and ever more directly described as a thing of the past. In light of 
rising powers like China and ever increasing conflicts among the 
world’s most important states, peace is singled out as being a luxury 
of the past that is no longer affordable. Nowadays, the dominating 
view is that only by pooling their resources and fully embracing 
power politics, the European Union will be able to survive in this 
increasingly competitive Game of Thrones called international rela-
tions.3
As James Rogers argues together with Luis Simon, the other Direc-
tor of the ‘Group on Grand Strategy’: “Today, in the second decade 
of the twenty-first century, the European Union, its Member States 
and the European people stand at a cross-roads. As a new gene-
ration has started to come to power and new geopolitical forces 
have begun to reshape the world around us, the political vision that 
once guided European integration has lost its way. […] We should 
be under no illusions here; even our shared liberal values are not 
immune from corrupting foreign influences, particularly in a world 
where large and potentially predatory autocracies will acquire more 
and more influence and power. We argue that, increasingly, it will 
only be through an effective grand strategy and sheer power that we 
will be able to protect European values – the principles symbolising 
who we are – from the outside world. […] Europeans currently 
face two futures: a future of power or a future of ruin. There is no 
alternative: we can either remain the rulers, or become the ruled.” 
(Rogers and Simon 2011: 1; 8 and 6f.) 
Consequently, James Rogers (2012) was not pleased, when the 
Europen Union was awarded with the nobel peace price. In his 
opinion, this did send the wrong – peaceful – message: “As for the 
European Union: if it has a future at all, it is less as a European 
peacekeeper but as a global power, an instrument to allow Euro-
peans to speak – as Valéry Giscard d’Estaing put it in his opening 
speech to the European Convention in 2002 – ‘as a political power 
which will talk on equal terms to the greatest powers on our planet, 
either existing or future’. [N]o pro-European should congratulate 
themselves with respect to winning the Nobel Peace Prize; rather, 
they should see it more as a wake-up call, a means of encouraging 
more sophisticated geopolitical thinking about security in their 
own continent, and the role played by hard geostrategic power in 
the enforcement of order.”
As many publications of the ‘Group on Grand Strategy’ often 
positively refer to him (e.g. Rogers 2012a: 16; Rogers and Simón 
2011: 3), it is helpful to take a short view at the works of Robert 
Cooper. As the former Director-General for External and Politico-
Military Affairs at the General Secretariat of the Council, one of 
the most influential posts regarding Europe’s foreign policy, Cooper 
had been the lead author of the European Security Strategy which 
vehemently advocated that Europe must become a “Global Actor” 
– which is only a nicer way to demand a role as a leading world 
power.4 Cooper is said to be one of the most influential EU strate-
gists (Foley 2007) and he has vocally called for a European strat-
egy he calls “liberal imperialism”: ”Postmodern imperialism takes 
two forms. First there is the voluntary imperialism of the global 
economy. This is usually operated by an international consortium 
through International Financial Institutions such as the IMF and 
the World Bank. […] The second form of postmodern imperialism 
might be called the imperialism of neighbours. Instability in your 
neighbourhood poses threats which no state can ignore. Misgov-
ernment, ethnic violence and crime in the Balkans poses a threat to 
Europe. The response has been to create something like a voluntary 
UN protectorate in Bosnia and Kosovo.” (Cooper 2002: 18) In 
Cooper’s view, those who do not share his enthusiasm for the “vol-
untary imperialism of global economy“ will be targeted by Europe’s 
military: ”The challenge to the postmodern world is to get used 
to the idea of double standards. Among ourselves, we operate on 
the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing 
with more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the postmodern 
continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of 
an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is 
necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century 
world of every state for itself. Among ourselves, we keep the law but 
when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of 
the jungle.” (Cooper 2002: 16) 
The notion that the European Union has to (militarily) pre-
pare itself for new geopolitical competitions has nowadays nearly 
become commonplace in virtually every strategic document. 
Ashton’s paper, for example, also claims that “Europe’s geostrategic 
position today is marked by increased global volatility, emerging 
security challenges” and it refers to an “increased competition for 
energy, water and other resources both at a national and internatio-
nal level.” (Ashton 2013: 1) Likewise, the ‘European Global Stra-
tegy’ (2013: 11) predicts: “In the years to come there will be even 
greater competition from other powers for influence and resources 
in the strategic neighbourhood.” Finally, Rogers and Gilli (2013: 
6) are, as usual, more blunt in their assessment: “It is therefore 
imperative to identify and define the common ‘strategic interests’ 
of the Union. […] This begs the question: what sort of armed forces 
are Europeans likely to have (and need) by 2025? Moreover, how 
might Europeans better organise themselves to take part in the new 
global competition for wealth, influence and power?”
Notice that in this view, the strategic interests of the European 
Union are inextricably linked with military questions and the 
global struggle for power and influence – a view that has become 
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deeply entrenched within Europe’s political elites. In short, as 
Ashton (2013a) emphasized in a speech in March 2013, the mili-
tary has two roles, a more general one as a primary and indispen-
sable tool to acquire power, and a second – quite obvious – one, as 
the necessary means to wage wars: “The first is political, and it con-
cerns fulfilling Europe’s ambitions on the world stage. The second 
is operational: ensuring that Europe has the right military capabili-
ties to be able to act.” By arguing that the military is necessary for 
“fulfilling Europe’s ambitions on the world stage”, Ashton exposes 
herself as having embraced a similar view like, for example, Nick 
Witney, the former Head of the European Defense Agency: “The 
value of Europe’s armed forces is less in countering specific ’threats’ 
than as necessary instruments of power and influence in a rapidly 
changing world, where militaries still matter.“ (Witney 2011: 1; see 
also Rogers 2013) 
Similarly, Luis Simón (2013: 5) from the ‘Group on Grand Strat-
egy’ argues in an article named “No might, no right”: “Ultimately, 
the increasing marginalisation of the military in Europe results 
from a lack of understanding of the constructive and stabilising 
role it plays in international politics. Military power is not just an 
asset of last resort that comes to the fore in exceptional circum-
stances. It encompasses a wide array of ‘silent security’ functions, 
beyond defence or waging war, that is. These include intelligence, 
reconnaissance and surveillance, deterrence, prevention and 
defence diplomacy. In the words of Alfred Thayer Mahan, ‘force 
is never more operative than when it is known to exist but is not 
brandished’. ‘Broadly considered’, Mahan goes on, ‘force must be 
regarded as an inevitable factor in the maintenance of the general 
international balances’.”
But, for sure, in the view of Europe’s political elites, the military 
should also fulfill more ‘direct action’, i.e. military interventions, 
in order to enforce the interests of the ruling class. Inevitably this 
leads to two questions that are prominently addressed in all of the 
three main papers for the summit meeting: What should be the 
geographic scope of such military interventions and therefore the 
contours of an emerging European empire and what are the pri-
mary missions to be conducted therein?
2. Geographical Scope: Europe as an 
Empire
In Brussels, the expansion of the European sphere of power and 
influence is considered a necessary prerequisite in order to become 
a truly world power. The crucial point is to proceed step by step: 
“Of course, if the EU wants to become a global power, it first needs 
to assert itself as a power in its own region.“ (Renard 2011: 5) In 
this context, the American ‘pivoting’ to East Asia is interpreted as 
creating the necessity – or in many views: the opportunity – to 
finally establish the European Union as the regional hegemon in 
its backyard. 
This includes, as is made painfully clear by all three papers, the 
willingness to use force in order to uphold the European imperial 
order. As writes the European Global Strategy (2013: 11f.): “The 
EU’s global influence will increasingly be determined by its actions 
in its strategic neighbourhood. […] The EU should also be prepa-
red to undertake autonomously the full spectrum of civilian and 
military missions in the strategic neighbourhood in keeping with 
international law, when and where this is necessary to protect vital 
European interests. This implies the ability to project both civilian 
and military capabilities.” 
Here, Europe’s area of (military) interest far exceeds the imme-
diate neighbourhood, a point that is also put forward by Ashton 
(2013: 2 and 5) when she demands: “Europe must assume greater 
responsibility for its own security and that of its neighbourhood. 
[…] The Union must be able to act decisively through CSDP as a 
security provider, in partnership when possible but autonomously 
when necessary, in its neighbourhood, including through direct 
intervention. Strategic autonomy must materialize first in the EU’s 
neighbourhood. […] Increasingly also the ‘neighbours of the neigh-
bours’ are being affected, e.g. in the Sahel or in the Horn of Africa, 
two regions where the Union is conducting five crisis management 
missions.”
While not advocating ‘boots on the ground’ in East Asia, Ashton 
(2013: 9) nevertheless even stresses the necessity for a maritime 
military presence in the region: “Europe’s maritime security is an 
integral part of its overall security. It is a crucial domain.  Modern 
economies  depend  heavily  on open  sea lanes and the  freedom to 
navigate  (90% of European trade  is by sea):  strategic stockpiles 
are now based  at sea, across the globe, on route from supplier to 
customer. In the near future, new sea lanes could open up with 
important geostrategic implications. The Arctic in particular will 
require increasing attention in terms of maritime safety, surveil-
lance and environmental protection. The EU has  strategic mari-
time  security  interests  around the globe and needs to be able to 
safeguard them against significant maritime risks and threats  -  ran-
ging from illegal  migration, drug trafficking, smuggling of goods 
and illegal fishing to terrorism maritime piracy and armed robbery 
at sea  as well as  territorial maritime disputes and acts of aggression 
or armed conflict between states.”
This coincides with the views of Rogers and Gilli (2013: 32) which 
are, again, a little bit more straightforward in their statements, as 
they argue that a) Europe’s ‘area of interest’ extends far beyond the 
immediate neighborhood stretching deep into East Asia; and b) 
that in order to control these areas, a number of new military bases 
will be necessary – as some sort of new outposts of the European 
empire. “In particular, Europeans should focus on improving their 
ability to temporarily project and even permanently extend their 
armed forces into the EU’s geographic zones of privileged interest. 
[T]hese regions include the eastern, northern and southern neigh-
bourhoods – the Caucasus, the Wider North, the Middle East and 
North Africa – and, importantly, the regions bordering with them, 
from Sub-Saharan Africa to Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Con-
sequently, given the predominantly maritime and littoral nature of 
these regions, Europeans should – at the broadest level – put greater 
emphasis on maintaining and enhancing their naval and aerospace 
capabilities, as well as the logistical means to sustain them.”
Beside the more general description of ‘necessary’ military mis-
sions (see box), Rogers and Gilli (2013: 32f.) also make some 
forecasts in this context: “[I]n addition to disaster response, stabi-
lisation and peacekeeping missions – not dealt with in this Report, 
given the extensive experience already accumulated by the EU in 
this sphere over the past decade – EU armed forces may need to 
mount the following kinds of military operation by 2025:
Forward presence missions, such as:
1.  Naval patrols to enhance regional confidence, protect trade 
routes or prevent piracy, such as in the Indo-Pacific region or 
the Gulf of Guinea
2.  Command of the sea to dissuade foreign aggression during peri-
ods of tension. 
Offensive missions, such as:
1.  Force projection to stop a civil war in Central Africa or elsewhere
2.  Expeditionary warfare to constrain an aggressive regime in the 
wider Middle East.
Defensive missions, such as:
1.  Defending against (or better, deterring) cyber and ballistic mis-
sile attacks on the European homeland
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2.  Protecting overseas territories or critical infrastructure (e.g. the 
Suez Canal).”
Yet, being able to conduct such missions ‘autonomously’ – i.e. 
largely independent from the United States – requires large mili-
tary capacities: “Defining such ‘autonomy’ once and for all may 
be challenging, of course, but it surely entails the ability to assess a 
crisis situation independently of foreign intelligence (or at least the 
capacity to evaluate its truthfulness and reliability); the possession 
and control of the capabilities required to fulfil a given mission; 
and relative security of supply of the relevant equipment as well as 
access to the enabling technologies.” (Rogers and Gilli 2013: 14)
James Rogers’ Imperial Designs
Europe’s Military Missions
“A tentative checklist of common EU objectives and ‘strategic 
interests’ […] may well include, along with a peaceful, stable 
and prosperous neighbourhood:
1. Safeguarding the European ‘homeland’ from foreign con-
ventional, CBRN or cyberattacks, as perpetrated by (surroun-
ding or distant) state or non-state actors
2. Securing maritime communication lines and strategic com-
munications infrastructure – including maritime chokepoints, 
energy transmission pipelines and computer systems (which are 
all vital for the European economy and way of life) – from blok-
kade or hostile actions
3. Protecting supplies of energy and raw materials in overseas 
territories and remote lands (including their trading systems) 
from exploitation or annexation by foreign players, while 
developing ways to guarantee the ‘global commons’ by inclu-
ding ever more stakeholders
4. Maintaining regional balances of power(s) which favour 
European values and requirements, namely through internatio-
nal law and an inclusive multilateral system, starting with the 
UN Charter and the treaties, regulations and regimes of other 
key international bodies.“ (Rogers and Gilli 2013: 17f.)
Rogers’ Grand Area
”Given that certain powers have sought to take advantage 
of key regions and entrench themselves – often to the disad-
vantage of others – the European Union should do more to 
ascertain the minimal geographic area required to sustain the 
continued expansion of its own economy. From a geopolitical 
perspective, this zone would have to meet five criteria: 
1. It would have to hold all the basic resources necessary 
to fuel European manufacturing needs and future industrial 
requirements;
2. Contain all the key trade routes, especially energy trans-
mission pipelines and maritime shipping routes, from other 
regions to the European homeland;
3. Have the fewest possible geopolitical afflictions that could 
lead to the area’s disintegration and thereby harm future Euro-
pean economic development;
4. Show the least likelihood of significant encroachment by 
powerful foreign actors, relative to its importance to the Euro-
pean economy and geopolitical interests;
5. Represent an area the European Union Region can work 
towards defending most cost-effectively through the expansion 
of the Common Security and Defence Policy – in other words, 
without mandating an excessive and draining defence effort.“ 
(Rogers 2011: 21)
“New European military stations may be required in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, the Artic Region, and along the 
coastlines of the Indian Ocean. The intention behind these 
installations would be […] to exercise a latent but permanent 
power within the ’Grand Area‘.“ (ibid.: 23)
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3. Military Means: Pooling to generate 
more Capacities
Some 20 years ago, Belgian economist and politician Mark 
Eyskens coined a phrase that is heavily cited these days: “Europe 
is an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm.”5 As 
should have become clear so far, Brussels’ political elite is dead set 
to become a political giant which in their view necessitates a gigan-
tic military apparatus. With this in mind, the fans of a European 
empire face a serious problem: Actually, the large majority of the 
European population is arguing for rigorous cuts in the military 
budgets instead of continual reductions in social spending – in a 
survey in Germany it was an overwhelming majority of about 82 
percent (ZDF-Politikbarometer 2012). In France and other Euro-
pean countries, there is a similar mood: “If faced with a tradeoff 
between funding entitlements, such as pensions, health care, and 
social welfare payments versus defense, the choice would be obvi-
ous. In Europe, ’abstract notions of national security and defence 
mean little when fundamental issues of social existence are at 
stake.’” (Flanagan 2011: 156)
Against this background, Ashton (2013: 2) tries to emphasize the 
benefits of the armaments sector – and therefore of high military 
budgets - to the public. “[T]he  European defence market  is  also 
feeling the effects of the financial crisis. Europe’s defence industries 
are not only important for our security, by providing capabilities 
for our armed forces, but also for jobs, growth and innovation.” 
This claim is complete nonsense: For one, nowadays new technolo-
gies are almost exclusively developed by civilian companies, and the 
arms industry draws on their know-how and not vice versa, as has 
been documented by a number of studies (see e.g. Barrinha 2010: 
473; Mawdsley 2011: 17). Furthermore, it is a particular bad idea 
to throw money to armaments companies in the hope that this 
would create jobs: “Many research studies show that investment 
in the military is the least effective way to create jobs, regardless of 
the other costs of military spending. According to a University of 
Massachusetts study, defence spending per US$ one billion creates 
the fewest number of jobs, less than half of what it could generate 
if invested in education and public transport. At a time of desper-
ate need for investment in job creation, supporting a bloated and 
wasteful military can not be justified given how many more jobs 
such money would create in areas such as health and public trans-
port.” (Slijper 2013: 3)
So, while there had been a significant increase in the European 
military budgets – as well as in corporate profits7  – between 2000 
and 20128 and although the recent budget cuts are way less severe 
than one would think in light of the constant moaning from poli-
tics, industry and military, a substantial increase is currently not in 
the cards. Rogers and Gilli (2013: 15) point to this problem as well 
as to what they regard as the possible solution: “As there is little 
hope of any increase in national spending for the foreseeable future, 
the only solution to counter such a risk is to do more together. This 
may well be the only way not only to maintain core capabilities but 
also to develop new ones – together.” In the view of Rogers and Gilli 
(2013: 5), the stakes are incredibly high: “Failing to act, therefore, 
means that a mixture of acute budgetary pressures, lack of invest-
ment in research and development, and widespread reluctance to 
make the maintenance of effective armed forces a political priority 
could cause additional reductions in EU military capacity as well as 
a potential exodus of the defence industry and a loss of technolo-
gical leadership. Demilitarisation and deindustrialisation risk going 
hand-in-hand.” In their view, this would be a major setback: “Euro-
peans will need to preserve a minimum of strategic autonomy in key 
sectors of the European armaments industry in order to maintain 
(and further develop) the operational and technological capacity to 
collaborate with allies and partners and to compete (also militarily) 
with emerging global players.” (Rogers and Gilli 2013: 18)
Catherine Ashton (2013: 20f.) quite similarly argues: “Declining 
defence budgets, combined with the fragmentation of European 
demand and supply requirements jeopardise the sustainability of 
this industry.  […] Apart from a few notable exceptions, no Euro-
pean government alone can launch major new programmes: the 
necessary investments are too high and the national markets are 
too small. With defence budgets under pressure, further market-
driven industrial restructuring and consolidation is inevitable.” For 
Ashton (2013: 20), this is a highly unfortunate perspective as she 
sees a strong and autonomous armaments industry as a key strate-
gic asset and therefore a valuable tool of a state’s power: “A strong, 
healthy and globally competitive European Defence and Techno-
logical Industrial Base (EDTIB)  is a prerequisite for developing 
and sustaining defence capabilities and securing the strategic auto-
nomy of Europe. […] Declining defence budgets, combined with 
the fragmentation of European demand and supply requirements 
jeopardise the sustainability of this industry.”9 
Therefore, the “fragmentation” of demand (too many different 
national procurement programs) and supply (too many and too 
small companies) is identified as the key problem.10 Low margins 
are the result, leading to high prices and risking the competitiveness 
of Europe’s companies in the global market. To avoid the fate of 
being “demilitarized and deindustrialized”, in recent years ‘Poo-
ling and Sharing’ (P&S) – the collective procurement and use of 
military equipment - has become the most important initiative, 
as Ashton (2013: 15f.) makes clear: “Cooperation in the area of 
military capability development has become essential to the main-
tenance of capabilities and to the success of CSDP.  Cooperation 
allows Member States to develop, acquire, operate and maintain 
capabilities together, making best use of potential economies of 
scale and to enhance military effectiveness. Pooling & Sharing was 
launched  to address this, and good progress has been achieved. 
[…] A strong impulse is required at European Council level, both 
to embed Pooling & Sharing in Member States’ defence planning 
and decision-making processes, and to deliver key capabilities 
through major cooperative projects.” Therefore Ashton (2013: 15) 
proposes various incentives in order to ‘encourage’ European arma-
ment cooperation: “In order to make cooperation more systematic, 
the European Council should also decide on incentives for defence 
cooperation in Europe  or collaborative projects, including  of a 
fiscal  nature  such as VAT exemption. Protecting cooperative pro-
jects and initiatives from budget cuts would act as a real incentive. 
Innovative financing arrangements (Private Finance Initiative or 
Public Private Partnerships) should also be considered.”
Pooling & Sharing shall foster the consolidation of the industrial 
supply side as well: As fewer programs will mean fewer orders for 
fewer companies, a wave of mergers & acquisitions is to be expected. 
The whole logic and endpoint of this consolidation process – a 
Transeuropeanized defence industry, concentrated in the hands of 
a few so called Eurochampions - has been aptly summarized by 
Stefan Zoller, former Chief Executive Officer of EADS’ armament 
subsidiary Cassidian: “The survivability of the European defense 
and security industries is endangered against the background [of ] 
global challenges, which, however, at the same time are also the 
decisive factor in Europe’s positioning as an actor in world politics. 
Consolidation by concentration […] is as necessary as it is basically 
also possible. […] This aim stands or falls, however, with the politi-
cal readiness to support and flank corresponding industrial-politi-
cal measures. […] The objective of a consolidation of the European 
defense and security industry, however it might be designed, must 
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be focussed on a dimension which at least tends to correspond to 
that of the U.S.-American market.“ (Zoller 2011: 239-249)
According to a recent study, conducted by the consulting firm 
McKinsey, the European Union has high expectations: in the future 
it hopes to save approximately one third of its equipment spending 
due to Pooling & Sharing (Handelsblatt 201311). Although it is 
unclear, weather increased armament cooperation will be able to 
save money at all (see Wagner 2012: 48ff.), even more important 
is the fact, that the expected savings are not meant to be used for 
reductions of the military budgets – quite the contrary: The goal 
of Pooling & Sharing is to free up money to buy more and ‘better’ 
military equipment. In short, it is all about more bang for the buck, 
as Claude-France Arnould, Chief of the European Defence Agency, 
points out: “Pooling & Sharing cannot be an alibi to further reduce 
efforts. It is a way to harness and maximise investment. Pooling 
& Sharing is not an excuse to invest less; rather, it offers a way to 
acquire together what is out of reach individually and get more 
efficiency in the deployment of these capabilities.” (Arnould 2012)
4. Potential Obstacles: Sovereignty, 
Oligopolization or Superstate? 
As argued above, a concentration of political and industrial power 
is seen by a huge majority of Europe’s elites as the only way to 
generate ‘sufficient’ military capacities. But, at the same time, every 
state tries to hold a grip on as much political influence as possi-
ble and to ensure the survival of its own armaments industry. As 
the former Head of the European Defence Agency, Nick Witney, 
complained: “Governments generally insist that it is up to indus-
try leaders to consolidate their companies according to commercial 
considerations. But the same politicians […] try to ensure that, 
when the inevitable industry contraction and consolidation occurs, 
their own ’national champion’ is amongst the last men standing.“ 
(Witney 2008: 38.)
As Europe is still composed out of competing nation sates with 
different interests, this could serve as a potential stumbling block 
for those who aspire a ‘European Superpower’: “[D]espite a decade 
of rhetoric and initiatives for more cooperation and less national 
influence on EU defence, national prerogatives still dominate”, 
laments a study, prepared for the Directorate General for External 
Policies of the European Union (Mölling and Brune 2011: 15). On 
the other hand, one should not underestimate the extent to which 
Europe’s elites are unhappy with their – as they call them – “bonsai 
armies” (Rogers and Gilli 2013: 52). That’s why there are a number 
of urgent calls to overcome national reservations and to take bold 
steps at the summit meeting. For example, Jolyon Howorth (2013) 
from the ‘Group on Grand Strategy’ argues: “Prognoses for the suc-
cess of the December Council range from pessimistic to dire. Most 
commentators predict minimal progress on essentially technical 
issues. This is a recipe for failure. The summit is too necessary to 
risk being a non-event. It should not be about fine-tuning. If CSDP 
is to develop into a policy area with a future, it is time to ask some 
probing, fundamental questions.” 
Essentially, there are two ways to create a European military super-
power, one would come at the expense of the small and medium 
Member States, the other would cost the most powerful ones much 
of their current influence – both involve a massive transfer away 
from the (or from some) nation states, although in very different 
ways. The first option would be to lay Europe’s military policy com-
pletely in the hands of a Tri-directorate of Germany, France and 
Great Britain. Thereby, taking bold steps would no longer be hin-
dered and blocked by the reservations (and interests) of the small 
and medium Member States. For example, according to Chrisitan 
Mölling, who was involved in the preparation of the highly influ-
ential EUISS report (Rogers and Gilli 2013: 4), this is Europe’s 
only chance to escape what he calls its current crisis of defence: “As 
the political decisions necessary for the structural change and their 
implementation will increasingly depend upon those three states, 
they should create an informal leading trio. […] The task of this 
trio would be to foster the defence-political focus of Europe along 
the lines of effectiveness and efficiency. As a matter of fact, the three 
would work out a consensus over topics among themselves. Due to 
their political influence und to the means of the three lead nations, 
this consensus would have to be understood as a clear recommen-
dation to other states of Europe.” (Mölling 2013: 30)
Yet, attempts leading to a quasi Oligopolization of Europe’s mili-
tary policy are met with great skepticism if not outright hostility 
from those countries that could quickly find themselves deprived 
of a say over Europe’s (and their own national) military policy.12 
This is also the reason, why the details how to activate a ‘Perma-
nent Structured Cooperation’  (PSC), a new option created by the 
Lisbon Treaty to form ‘core groups’ out of the willing and military 
capable that can exclusively deal with specific aspects of Europe’s 
CSDP, have not been hammered out so far. As Ashton (2013: 16) 
writes: “[T]he Treaty provides for an opportunity for an enhanced 
form of cooperation through Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PESCO). While there have been initial exploratory discussions in 
2009 and 2010 on the implementation of PESCO, the appetite to 
move forward remains limited at this stage.”
Yet, the current financial and economic crisis could turn itself out 
to be a blessing in disguise for a transfer of power to such a Tri-
directorate as financially strapped small and medium states could 
come under immense pressure to give up parts of their sovereignty 
in the military area, maybe in exchange for ‘cheaper’ equipment 
or whatever, like many of them had already to do in the econo-
mic sphere. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine that most of the 
Member States could be willing to fully entrust their sovereignty to 
Germany, France and Great Britain. That’s why a second option for 
‘Superpower Europe’ comes into play, which on the one hand tries 
to address the reservations about national sovereignty and on the 
other those about being subordinated to the will of a few European 
powers. 
In this context, Rogers and Gilli (2013: 53) argue that Europeans 
are already loosing their sovereignty because they are increasingly 
unable to wage war. Therefore transferring – Europeanizing – the 
military policy from the nation state to the European Union (and 
not to some powerful nation states) is described as a prerequisite 
for regaining some sort of sovereignty, not for abolishing it: “[C]
oncerns about the possible loss of national sovereignty – legitimate 
though they may be – that managing and developing military capa-
bilities together (as argued in this Report) may imply, seem some-
what beside the point. Europeans are already losing sovereignty by 
not consolidating, not optimising, not innovating, not regionalising 
and not integrating their military capabilities. They are also losing 
‘strategic autonomy’, and (re)gaining at least some requires action 
and determination. Generating both requires, in turn, appropri-
ate enabling mechanisms.” In this view, there is no alternative to a 
fully communitarised – i.e. fully laid into the competences of the 
European Union – military policy, if one wants to become a ‘Super-
power Europe’: “Needless to say, the level of interdependence and 
integration among the member states in the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) framework is hardly comparable to that in defence 
policy – in legal, institutional and political terms. Yet is it really 
inconceivable to imagine (and sketch out) a similar process in the 
security and defence domain?” (Rogers and Gilli 2013: 55) Where 
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this should end – and why - Rogers and Simon (2011: 4 and 8) 
made unmistakably clear: “The old European nation-states are no 
longer big enough to make their voices heard in a rapidly changing 
world, and [...] the best way to protect the values that those natio-
nal communities hold dear is through a greater and more potent 
grouping. […] In short, the European Union must become a super-
state and a super-nation, which should enable it – in turn – to 
become a superpower.“
It is very hard to predict which path the European project will take, 
as we can currently see a strange mix of proposals and initiatives. 
Some of them, for example the relentless drives to finally hammer 
out the details of PSC or pressure to introduce majority voting in 
the area of CSDP13, suggest that we are moving in the direction of 
an ‘Oligopolistic Superpower’. On the other hand, especially the 
growing role of the European Commission which has been de facto 
charged with the task to create a truly European defence market, an 
area where the Member States up to some years ago would never 
have given it a say (Lösing and Wagner 2013), or the renewed 
debate over establishing a truly European Army (Major 2012) tend 
to favour the concept of a ‘Europeanized Superpower’. This rather 
schizophrenic dual-track-approach is reflected in the Final Report 
of the Future of Europe Group (2012: 2), prepared by the Foreign 
Ministers of eleven Member States: “In the long term, we should 
seek more majority decisions in the CFSP sphere, joint representa-
tion in international organizations, where possible, and a European 
defence policy. For some members of the Group this could even-
tually involve a European army.”
Yet, these two different visions for Europe’s future are essentially 
only two sides of the same militaristic coin. Stressing the need for 
a more efficient – i.e. more deadly - military policy, both demand 
a transfer of power and competences away from most (Oligopoli-
zation) or all (Europeanization) of the nation states. But as every 
step in one of those directions will inevitably lead to an even more 
aggressive foreign policy, they have to be met with outright resi-
stance – at the European Summit as well as in its aftermath.
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Endnotes
1 When reference is made hereinafter to “Europe“, the author is 
well aware of the fact that the European Union by no means 
comprises all countries and people of the continent. Although 
reference should therefore actually rather be made to ”EUrope“ 
and “EUropean“, the other spelling is used because it is much 
easier to read. 
2 This sample is justified by a combination of the facts that those 
three reports were the most frequently cited in the debate and 
because all three have a highly prominent institutional back-
ground.
3 For example, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair  argues: 
“For Europe, the crucial thing is to understand that the only way 
that you will get support for Europe today is not on the basis of 
a sort of post-war view that the EU is necessary for peace. […] 
The rationale for Europe today therefore is about power, not 
peace. […] In a world in particular in which China is going to 
become the dominant power of the 21st century, it is sensible for 
Europe to combine together, to use its collective weight in order 
to achieve influence.“ (Hough 2011)
4 The European Security Strategy (2003: 1) claims: „As a union 
of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter 
of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide 
range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inev-
itably a global player.“
5 http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Mark_Eyskens 
6 The quote is from Jack Treddenick. 
7 In December 2012, the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) published the “European Security, Defense, and 
Space (ESDS) Index” which is composed of 21 defence and 
security companies: “The analysis shows that, between 2001 
and 2011, revenue for companies in the CSIS ESDS Index grew 
from 58 billion to 91 billion euros (in constant 2011 euros), a 
57.7 percent increase overall…” (Hofbauer et. al. 2012: 35)
8 According to SIPRI (2013), the combined European military 
budgets (in constant prices) rose from $250 billion (2000) to 
$286 billion (2012). 
9 Likewise the European Global Strategy (2013: 21) claims: „The 
preservation of effective military capabilities will continue to 
depend on the maintenance of a competitive European defence 
technological and industrial base, acting in keeping with the 
global arms Trade Treaty. This requires more than just a deepen-
ing of the EU’s defence market. coordinated investment in dual-
use technologies can boost both security of supply to the armed 
forces and European economic growth.”
10 Rogers and Gilli (2013: 6) demand: “Implementing consolida-
tion to generate military efficiency. This suggests a coordinated 
reduction of redundant and obsolete capabilities to generate 
immediate and future savings. In order to facilitate this task, 
member states may consider asking the EEAS and its specialised 
bodies to undertake, in close cooperation with the EDA, a tar-
geted EU Military Review.”
11 Outright ridiculous is the upper end of the savings the Euro-
pean Added Value Unit (2013: 8) thinks possible in its “Cost of 
Non-Europe Report“: “The spread for the cost of non-Europe 
in defence is thought to range from €130 billion, at the higher 
end, to at least €26 billion, on a more conservative calculation.”
12 Although this would go beyond the scope of this paper, it should 
be mentioned that another problem is created by the heavy con-
flicts between Germany - that in recent years vocally claimed a 
leading role in Europe – with France as well as with Great Brit-
ain (see Lösing and Wagner 2013).
13 Ideally, PSCs, for example, would be a major exception, a CSDP 
decision has to be taken unanimously which gives the small 
and medium ones enormous influence in this policy area (see 
Wagner 2012: 18f.). 
